John Robert McCall v. Earl N. Dorius : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
John Robert McCall v. Earl N. Dorius : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David M Bown; Attorney for Respondent.
Vernon B Romney; Attorney General; M Reid Russell; Assistant Attorney General; Bernard M
Tanner; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, McCall v. Dorius, No. 13450.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/724
EWT 
r NO. 
LAW LIBRARY 
«,*/.« i t Il"JI$F Y0UNG UNIVERSITY 
D U r K C i V l l i ^ ^ S f M e n Clark Law School 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN ROBERT MoCALL, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver 
License Division, State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
13450 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal for a Reversal of the Judgment of the.Third 
j r f f f l - * Court, in and for fl*I*.Ccjg. 
State of Utah, the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Presiding. 
;'-^ t 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
M. REID RUSSELL 
Assistant Attorney General 
4 BERNARD M. TANNER 
Assistant Attorney General 
CJork. suprem9 Courf."^!"""" Attorneys for Appellant 
DAVID M. BOWN 
321 South 6th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
LBMUUNC PKKC« U»7 SOUTH MAW STUKT SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH PHOHI 4 D 4 U I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
BACKGROUND 4 
ARGUMENT 6 
POINT I. THE RESPONDENT HAD NO ABSO-
LUTE RIGHT TO COUNSEL BEFORE DE-
CIDING TO TAKE THE TEST, AS THIS IS 
A CIVIL MATTER AND MR. McCALL GAVE 
HIS CONSENT ON THIS AT THE TIME 
HE OBTAINED A LICENSE; MR. McCALL'S 
FAILURE TO SO TAKE THE TEST DESIG-
NATED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME 
WAS A PROPER REASON FOR THE FIL-
ING OF THE REFUSAL AFFIDAVIT 6 
POINT II. THE RESPONDENT HAD ADE-
QUATE TIME TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
OR NOT TO TAKE THE CHEMICAL TEST 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10, AS 
AMENDED 10 
POINT III. RESPONDENT'S ACTION CONSTI-
TUTED A REFUSAL UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-6-44.10 AND OFFICER FURR WAS 
JUSTIFIED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO THE CHEMICAL 
TESTS WAS COMPLETED 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 
Page 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN 
NOT REQUIRING THE REVOCATION OF 
THE RESPONDENT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE 
TO REMAIN IN FORCE UNDER THE PRES-
ENT FACTS 13 
CONCLUSION 15 
CASES CITED 
Anderson v. Macduff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 
257 (1955) 10 
Bean v. State, 12 Utah 2d 76, 362 P. 2d 750 (1961).. 12 
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432 9 
Calciano v. Hults, 13 App. Div. 2d 534, 213 N. Y. S. 
2d 500 (1961) 13 
Campbell v. Superior Court in and for Maricopa 
County, 479 P. 2d 685, 106 Ariz. 542 6 
Clancy v. Kelly, 7 App. Div. 2d 820, 180 N. Y. S. 2d 
923 (1958) 13 
Combes v. Kelly, 2 Misc. 2d 591, 152 N. Y. S. 2d 943 
(1956) 10 
Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 265 A. C. A. 
1073, 71 Cal. Rptr. 723 8 
Finley v. Orr, 262 A. C. A. 711, 69 Cal. Rptr. 137 8 
Funk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 1 Cal. App. 
3rd 449, 18 Cal. Rptr. 662 9 
Garcia v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 456 P. 2d 85 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 
Page 
Goodman v. Orr, 1971, 97 Cal. Rptr. 226,19 C. A. 3rd 
845 6 
Hunter v. Darius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877 .5,12 
Johnson v. Dept. of Mtr. Vehicles, 485 P. 2d 1258 
(Oregon 1971) 6,8,9 
Lee v. State, 187 Kansas 566, 358 P. 2d 765 (1961) .... 5 
Mills v. Bridges, 471 P. 2d 66, 93 Idaho 679 6,8 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602,16 
L. Ed. 2d 694,10 A. L. R. 3d 974 (1966) 4 
People v. Brown, 485 P. 2d 500 6,7 
Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 
415,110 N. W. 2d 75 (1961) 10 
Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P. 2d 943 
(Utah 1959) 5,12 
Rust v. Division of Motor Vehicles, et al., 1971, 267 
C. A. 2d 545, 73 Cal. Rprs. 366 6,8 
Stratikos v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1968) 477 P. 
2d 237 6,8 
Taylor v. Kelly, 5 App. Div. 2d 931, 171 N. Y. S. 2d 
909 (1958) 13 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953) 1,2,4,7,12,14 
U. S. C. A. Const. Amends. 4, 9 9 
1967 Perm. Supp., Colorado Revised Statutes, § 13-
5-30(3) et seq 7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 
Page 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Const, art. 2, §§ 3, 7 7 
62A Consolidated Laws of New York, Art. 31 § 1194.. 4 
7 North Dakota Century Code 39-20 Chemical Test 
for Intoxication 4 
17 Albany L. Rev. 258 4 
18 Albany L. Rev. 203 4 
51 Mich. L. Rev. 1195 4 
44 Minn. L. Rev. 673 4 
35 Tex. L. Rev. 813 6 
88 A. L. R. 2d 1064 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN ROBERT McCALL, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver 
License Division, State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Is the revocation of respondent's driver's license pur-
suant to Section 41-6-44.10 for failure to take the chemical 
test a refusal when he refuses to respond because of the 
"Miranda" warning or where he alleges he did not under-
stand all of the "Miranda" warning, or where he alleges 
he was refused a right to consult an attorney. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On May 21, 1973, appellant revoked respondent's 
driver's license to drive for one year effective April 2, 
Case No. 
13450 
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1973, for the latter's failure to submit to a sobriety test 
under sec. 41-6-44.10, U. C. A., as amended. Pursuant to 
the act respondent filed for a trial de novo in the district 
court of Salt Lake County for a determination of whether 
respondent's license was subject to revocation. The case 
was heard before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall on July 
12, 1973. Judge Hall found that respondent had a right 
to contact counsel prior to deciding whether to take the 
offered chemical test under the implied consent law. 
Judge Hall further found the officer failed to adequately 
distinguish between the criminal matter and the civil 
matter and therefore revocation was not warranted. Judge 
Hall held this was not a refusal and filed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law to that effect. No order or decree 
other than minute entry was apparently filed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law granting return of 
respondent's driver's license and seeks an order in har-
mony with the appellant's order of revocation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Trooper Stephen R. Furr testified respondent was 
noticed on the wrong side of the Wendover road at about 
the Salt Plant, traveling at a rate of speed higher than 
warranted for the road conditions (R. 46, R. 47). The 
trooper had trouble stopping Mr. McCall (R. 47). He 
noticed the odor of alcohol (R. 48.5), administered field 
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a 
sobriety tests which the trooper felt were unsatisfactory 
(R. 55, R. 67). 
Trooper Furr placed him under arrest, and he evi-
denced that Mr. McCall was a little belligerent subse-
quently (R. 57, R. 70). 
The trooper advised him of his "Miranda" rights and 
read him the Implied Consent rights (R. 48.5, R. 49, R. 
54, R. 58, R. 72). 
He was advised of Implied Consent rights twice (R. 
58). Trooper Kooring substantiated all this testimony, 
also in direct answer to the Court (R. 71). 
Mr. McCall did not dispute that he was read 
"Miranda" (R. 49, R. 86) but said he did not understand 
the last part (R. 49, R. 86), but also, he did admit he was 
read a long thing at the jail, Which he did not understand 
(R. 88, R. 93). There was some testimony about contact 
lenses, being in too long, calling his wife, etc., but most 
of this was in dispute (R. 57, R. 58, R. 64, R. 70, R. 71). 
Trooper Furr and Trooper Kooring said McCall never 
asked to call a lawyer (R. 58, R. 70, R. 71). 
The officer offered a breath test. Mr. McCall refused 
to take any test and said he wasn't taking any teste (R. 
58, R. 70, R. 71, R. 93). 
Mr. McCall was given the time and opportunity to 
contact counsel but he did not contact an attorney; a 
little more than an hour elapsed from arrest to refusal 
(R. 59, and Exhibit 1-P in Record on Appeal). 
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BACKGROUND 
There is ample authority that this is a "civil case." 
It is the position of the appellant, that there is a 
differentiation between the civil and criminal aspects of 
the facts constituting a single incident, and as a general 
rule this right is recognized by most jurisdictions within 
the area of the eleven western states that the implied 
consent aspect of such an incident is civil in nature and 
that the criminal law nor the "Miranda" rights apply 
thereto. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 
16 L. Ed. 694, 10 A. L. R, 3d 974 (1966). 
To set the matter in perspective, it is suggested that 
legislatures of various states, including Utah, in order 
to cope with the tremendous increase in drunk driving, 
and to help overcome the many evidentiary difficulties 
in proving intoxication, have enacted Implied Consent 
Laws requiring persons to submit to breath, blood, urine 
or saliva tests or lose their license for refusing to do so. 
62A Consolidated Laws of New York, Article 31, para-
graph 1194; 7 North Dakota Century Code, 39-20, Chem-
ical Tests for Intoxication: Implied Consent; Utah Code 
Annotated 41-6-44.10. These suggested measures which 
are the laws of the jurisdictions referred to have been 
widely discussed in various law review articles and the 
Court's attention is dranw to the following reports: 18 
Albany Law Review, 203; 17 Albany Law Review, 268; 
51 Michigan Law Review 1195; 34 Minnesota Law Re-
view, 673; 35 Texas Law Review 813; and an annotation 
at 88 A. L. R. 2d 1054. 
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As the laws presently stand, prerequisites under 
Utah law are essential to the validity of the revocation 
of a license. They are: 
1. The requirement of an appropriate invita-
tion to take the test including (a) the pre-
requisite arrest, (b) sufficient probable 
cause to consider the invitee to be intoxi-
cated, and (c) an appropriate opportunity 
to advise which of the tests is to be applied, 
and 
2. The refusal, either expressed or implied, 
must be communicated to, or reasonably 
presumed by the inviting officer. 
Authorities referred to: Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 
287, 33 Pacific 2d 943, 1959, and Contra, Lee v. State, 
Kansas 566, 358 Pacific 2d 765, 1961. In these matters 
the court recognized that fewer areas in the state had 
the technical equipment and facilities to administer all 
of the tests, and therefore, the validity of the refusal was 
not effected by the failure of the choice of the possible 
kinds of tests to which he would submit. 
Appellant avers this case is distinguishable from 
Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877. 
In the case before us, the arresting officer had reason-
able cause to believe Mr. McCall was intoxicated; he 
gave him the appropriate warning, both Miranda and 
the Implied Constent. Although there seems little doubt 
that he did so advise Mr. McCall there was an allegation 
by Mr. McCall that he did not get the "Miranda" warn-
ing, or did not understand the "Miranda" warning. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
The lower court's decision should be reversed for the 
following reasons: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RESPONDENT HAD NO ABSOLUTE 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL BEFORE DECIDING 
TO TAKE THE TEST, AS THIS IS A CIVIL 
MATTER AND MR. McCALL GAVE HIS 
CONSENT ON THIS AT THE TIME HE OB-
TAINED A LICENSE; MR. McCALL'S FAIL-
URE TO SO TAKE THE TEST DESIG-
NATED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME 
WAS A PROPER REASON FOR THE FIL-
ING OF THE REFUSAL AFFIDAVIT. 
There is serious doubt in many jurisdictions that 
such a right to counsel exists in the civil aspects of the 
Implied Consent Law where an arrested party must de-
cide whether or not to submit to a type of sobriety test. 
Mills v. Bridges, 471 P. 2d 66, 93 Idaho 679; I. S. § 49-352; 
Garcia v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 456 P. 2d 85; 
Rust v. Division of Mtor Vehicles, et al., 1971, 267 C. A. 
2d 545, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366; Stratikos v. Department of Mo-
tor Vehicles, (1968) 477 P. 2d 237; People v. Brown, 485 
P. 2d 500; Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 485 
P. 2d 1258, (Oregon 1971); Campbell v. Superior Court 
in and for Maricopa County, 479 P. 2d 685,106 Ariz. 542; 
Goodman v. Orr, 1971, 97 Cal. Rptr. 226, 19 C. A. 3rd 845. 
Utah has not ruled squarely on this issue. 
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A recent Colorado case has held that Implied dm 
sent statute is not unconstitutional on grounds that it 
violates right to travel upon state highways, or that it 
constitutes violation of due process by compelling citizen 
to choose either his right to refuse to surrender evidence 
that would help to convict- him or his right to retain li-
cense to drive, or creates a crime of refusing to consent 
to blood test punishable by forfeiture of right to drive 
while denying fundamental rights of person charged with 
criminal offense or that it enforces warrantless and un-
reasonable searches and seizures, or that it sanctions in-
vasion of privacy or privilege against self-incrimination. 
(Emphasis supplied.) Const. Art. 2 §§ 3, 7; U. S. C. A. 
Const. Amends, 4, 9; 1967 Perm. Supp., C. R. S., Section 
13-5-30(3) et seq. People v. Brown, 485 P. 2d 500, Brown's 
appeal to the T J. S. Supreme •Court was dismissed for 
want of a substantial Federal question. 9:2 S. Ct. 671. 
California has numerous cases on the specific ques-
tion of rights to counsel deciding such a right does not 
exist as to Implied Consent, 'this before they amended 
their statutes in 1970, and codified that fact (see para-
graph 3, Section No. 13353, Paragraph (a)), California 
Motor Vehicle Code and amended, Chapter 1 103, statutes 
1970, effective November 23, 1970 
The Implied Consent I , a w of California (prior to 
amendment), Idaho and On gc n all have provisions simi-
lar to the language of Ut I: Si: • : ill: I :: n 41 -6-44.10, U. C. A. 
1953, as amended, section (a). In several cases 'before 
the courts of last impression the decisions are unanimous 
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that the right to counsel before a decision to submit does 
not exist on the civil aspect. 
The only variance which counsel for defendant could 
find to this ruling (which nonetheless pronounced the 
validity of such a rule), was in the Rust case (see Rust 
v. Division of Motor Vehicles, et al., 1971, 267 C. A. 2d 
545, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366) which held that while "Miranda" 
rights do not apply to the Implied Consent Law (empha-
sis ours), there may be a factual issue that the officer did 
not make clear to the arrested party as to the differentia-
tion between criminal and civil rights and if that results 
in confusion to the arrested party and that is not cleared 
up by the officer, then there may be a question as to the 
arrested party's refusal to submit. 
Even greater clarification of the "right to counsel" 
and "civil" nature of the case is provided by an Oregon 
case on rehearing on the question of presence of his at-
torney, it was there held that the driver's refusal to take 
a breath-analyzer test without having his attorney pres-
ent was a refusal to take the test under the Implied Con-
sent Law, and justified suspension of his driver's license. 
(See Stratikos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, (1968) 
477 P. 2d 237, adhered to and Supplemental 478 P. 2d 
654; also Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, et al., 
485 P. 2d 1258. See also Mills v. Bridges, 471 P. 2d 66, 93 
Idaho 679; Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 265 
A. C. A. 1073, 71 Gal. Rptr. 726; Finley v. Orr, 262 A. C. A. 
711, 69 Cal. Rptr. 137. 
In the Ent and Finley cases the refusals were like-
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wise upheld. The language in another recent California 
case is supportive (see Funk v. Department of Motoa 
Vehicles, 1 Cal. App. 3rd 499, 18 Cal. Rptr.). 
A case on point is the Johnson case, supra, decided 
June 17,1971, where the attorney advised taking a breath-
alyzer when he got there. (Emphasis ours.): The at-
torney did not come. The Court said that any erroneous 
impression (emphasis supplied) upon which petitioner 
relied in failing to take the test (he thought he could re-
main silent), was created by his counsel, not the police, 
and the Court reversed the trial court, holding it was a 
refusal. Johnson v. Department of Motor Vehicles of the 
State of Oregon, Appellant, 485 P. 2d 1285. 
Mr. McCall has no right (emphasis supplied) to 
counsel before deciding whether he would or would not 
take the test. His right to remain silent does not cover 
implied consent, where he has given said consent by vir-
tue of the license he holds to drive on the highways of 
the state. Such a right exists under the Miranda case, 
where the actions are criminal in nature. 
Even in criminal cases, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that the absence of conscious consent by 
driver of automobile to the taking of blood from his body 
by a physician while the driver was unconscious, for pur-
pose of making a test to determine whether driver was 
under the inflence of intoxicating liquor, without more, 
did not necessarily render the taking a violation of a con-
stitutional right. U. S. C. A. Const. Amend. 14. Breith-
aupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432. 
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In Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 
415, 110 N. W. 2d 75 (1971) the Court held that the re-
vocation was not arbitrary and capricious because of the 
fact that an acquittal of a criminal charge had no bearing 
on the provisions of the law separate and distinct from 
criminal statutes. Prucha v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 
supra; also Combes v. Kelly, 2 Misc. 2d 591, 152 N. Y. S. 
2d 943 (1965); Anderson v. Macduff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 
N. Y. S. 2d 257 (1955). 
POINT II. 
THE RESPONDENT HAD A D E Q U A T E 
TIME TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR 
NOT TO TAKE THE CHEMICAL TEST UN-
DER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10, AS 
AMENDED. 
The Hunter case says that the petitioner had a reas-
onable time in which to determine whether to take or 
not to take the test. 
What that reasonable time is may vary from case to 
case, conditioned on fact such as: time of arrest or acci-
dent, time of consumption of last alcoholic beverage, time 
of last meal, whether blood test is proposed, breath test 
is proposed or a urine test, as the case may be. 
The state has a valid interest, as well as the indi-
vidual arrested, in an objective test of level of alcohol in 
a driver's bloodstream. This is true for protecting the 
rights of the arrested driver, as well as for the betterment 
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of law enforcement. The state makes these tests available 
to exonerate as well as to implicate, and it is in the inter-
est of both sides to make the test available so long as the 
results will have probative value. However, the time 
comes when sufficient periods have elapsed from arrest 
to potential testing that the obtainable results are really 
of no measureable quantity, and therefore, of no value. 
Whether of blood or breath that time, unless contro-
verted, is best established by the peace officer, technician, 
or doctor that is qualified and is going to administer the 
test. 
Here, the respondent had an hour and ten minutes 
from the time of arrest to the time Trooper Furr filled 
out the refusal form of affidavit in the jail. The respon-
dent alleges he was refused a phone and refused the 
opportunity to call an attorney, however this allegation 
was countered by the testimony of both Trooper Furr 
and Trooper Kooring, who said quite to the contrary 
that the respondent never asked these two things (R. 58, 
R. 70, R. 71). If respondent later said he wanted to take 
the test after the jailer talked to him, there was no evi-
dence at trial that Trooper Furr was subsequently con-
tacted, or requested to return to the jail, in response to 
such a request. There was good evidenec that respondent 
was in such condition that he may not have cared too 
much at that point at the jail (R. 94, R. 86). 
POINT III. 
RESPONDENT'S ACTION CONSTITUTED 
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A REFUSAL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 
41-6-44.10 AND OFFICER FURR WAS JUS-
TIFIED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE RE-
FUSAL TO SUBMIT TO THE CHEMICAL 
TESTS WAS COMPLETED. 
The Utah cases relating directly to revocation of a 
driver's license for failure to submit to a test under the 
statute are only these: Bean v. State, 12 Ut. 2d 76, 362 
P. 2d (1961); Ringwood v. State, 8 Ut. 2d 287, 333 P. 
2d (1959); Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Ut. 2d 122, 458 P. 2d 
877. The first two of these cases invalidate the revocation 
because the officer failed to give the accused his choice 
of which test of those offered under the statute he would 
take. The 1967 Amendment added a second sentence to 
paragraph a, leaving that decision within reasonable 
grounds with the peace officer. See 41-6-44.10 (a). 
"Any person operating a motor vehicle in 
this state shall be deemed to have given his con-
sent to a chemical test of his breath or blood for 
the purpose of determining the alcoholic con-
tent of his blood, provided that such test is ad-
ministered at the direction of a peace officer 
having reasonable grounds to believe such person 
to have been driving in an intoxicated condition. 
The arresting officer shall determine within rea-
son which of the aforesaid tests shall be admin-
istered." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Hunter case is distinguishable because although Dr. 
Hunter was clearly given his choice, he was given a chance 
to contact an attorney which opportunity he took, and 
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the court said he should have a reasonable time to do so. 
Here, Mr. McCall never asked for an attorney, though 
he had time to call one. 
Courts have considered that an implied refusal is 
sufficient. Calciano v. Hults, 13 App. Div. 2d 534, 213 
N. Y. S. 2d 500 (1961); Clancy v. Kelly, 7 App. Div. 2d 
820, 180 N. Y. S. 2d 923 (1958). The instant case is not 
rested on solely the implication. 
In Taylor v. Kelly, 5 App. Div. 2d 931, 171 N. Y. S. 
2d 909 (1958) the court stated that there was clear and 
direct proof of the licensee's refusal to take the blood 
test. The arresting officer and arraigning justice had 
both testified of the petitioner's refusal to submit to one 
of the sobriety tests offered. The instant case offers 
similar evidence from the arresting officer and also from 
Trooper Kooring (R. 71). 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT RE-
QUIRING THE REVOCATION OF THE RE-
SPONDENT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE TO RE-
MAIN IN FORCE UNDER THE PRESENT 
FACTS. 
The record reveals that, though the respondent 
alleges he did not refuse the test or tests, to the court's 
own question as to the question of refusal, Trooper Koor-
ing responded that Mr. McCall told him "Well, I know 
I understand, I am not going to take any of your tests" 
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(R. 72). This was unrebutted by Mr. McCall in his tes-
timony. With such unrebutted testimony in the record, 
substantiating the earlier testimony of Trooper Furr, the 
court erred in requiring the license privileges to be re-
turned. 
The statute, Section 41-6-44.10, U. C. A., does not 
require the officer to invite the respondent to take the 
test more than once. In this case the officer invited him 
to take the test on two occasions and in each case the 
respondent refused. 
Further, the court found that the officer had failed 
to differentiate between the "Miranda Warning" and the 
"Implied Consent" advice, and yet the record (R. 72, R. 
93) does not sustain this finding by the court; the record 
sets forth with clarity, that the officer advised the re-
spondent of both the criminal and civil rights, arising out 
of this single incident and that the respondent of his own 
volition did not request an attorney, and affirmatively 
refused to submit to a test after he understood the con-
sequences (R. 72). At that point, under the statute, it 
was the officer's obligation that "the test shall not be 
given and the arresting officer shall advise the person of 
his rights under this section." Section 41-6-44.10, U. C. A. 
This the officer did. 
We submit that the Judge in the trial court erred in 
not requiring the revocation to remain valid under the 
circumstances. 
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CONCLUSION 
Fundamental to the issues of this case and review 
thereof is the question of the right to remain silent, in-
cluding Implied Consent subsequent to the "Miranda 
Warning," further, the question of what, under these 
facts, was a reasonable time for decision making and 
testing by respondent, and right to counsel, civil right, 
under the Implied Consent Law. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that Miranda 
rights of saying nothing without counsel present, do not 
"relate over" or "umbrella" the civil aspect of the case; 
that response is required by virtue of the Implied Con-
sent Law and silence can be an implied refusal, and this 
is no violation of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment 
rights of the United States Constitution. That further, 
petitioner had his chance to talk to an attorney at the 
jail, and he refused to take advantage of the opportunity 
and that his remark finally that he would not take any 
tests made his refusal thereby perfected, it being prop-
erly concluded and reported by the trooper as a refusal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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